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Labor and Employment Law
by W. Melvin Haas IH*
William M. Clifton I'*
and W. Jonathan Martin II"
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article surveys recent developments in the state statutory and
common law that affect labor and employment relations of Georgia
employers. Accordingly, it surveys published decisions interpreting
Georgia law from June 1, 2009 to May 31, 2010.' This Article also
includes highlights of certain revisions to the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated (O.C.G.A.). 2

* Managing Partner and Macon Office Head in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith,
LLP, Macon, Georgia. Emory University (BA, 1968); University of Alabama (J.D., 1971).
Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAw (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006
& Supps.). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Alabama.
** Managing Partner in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP, Macon, Georgia.
Oglethorpe University (BA, magna cum laude, 1988); Georgia State University (M.A.,
1990); Columbia University (J.D., 1993). Law Clerk to the Honorable Duross Fitzpatrick,
United States District Judge for the Middle District of Georgia (1993-1995). Member, State
Bar of Georgia.
*** Managing Partner in the firm of Constangy, Brooks & Smith, LLP, Macon, Georgia.
University of Georgia (B.BA, cum laude, 1991); Mercer University, Walter F. George
School of Law (J.D., magna cum laude, 1994). Member, Mercer Law Review (1992-1994);
Administrative Editor (1993-1994). Chapter Editor, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW (John
E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supps.). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
The Authors would like to thank James Travis Griffin (J.D. candidate, Mercer
University, Walter F. George School of Law, 2012) and Michael Hill (J.D. candidate,
Washington and Lee School of Law, 2012) for their outstanding work in helping to research
for and write this Article.
1. For analysis of Georgia labor and employment law during the prior survey period,
see W. Melvin Haas m et al., Labor and Employment Law, Annual Survey of GeorgiaLaw,
61 MERCER L. REv. 213 (2009).
2. Attorneys practicing labor and employment law have a multitude of reference
sources for recent developments in federal legislation and case law. See generally THE
DEVELDPING LABOR LAW (John E. Higgins Jr. et al. eds., 5th ed. 2006 & Supp. 2009);
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RECENT LEGISLATION

A. Modification of Covenants Not to Compete
On April 29, 2009, former Georgia Governor Sonny Perdue signed into
law Georgia House Bill 173,1 amending existing law regarding employment contracts that restrict competition." This legislation became
effective on November 2, 2010, after Georgia voters passed an amendment to the Georgia Constitution.' House Bill 173 authorizes a court
to modify and limit the relief of otherwise unenforceable covenants'
rather than invalidate them entirely. The bill also provides specific

BARBARA T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (C.
Geoffrey Weirich et al. eds., 4th ed. 2007 & Supp. 2009); W. Christopher Arbrey et al.,
Labor and Employment, 2008 Eleventh CircuitSurvey, 60 MERCER L. REV. 1281 (2009);
Bureau of Nat1 Affairs, Daily LaborReport, BNA.coM, http*/www.bna.com/products/labor
/dlr.htm (last visited Nov. 11, 2010). Accordingly, this Article is not intended to cover the
latest developments in federal labor and employment law. Rather, this Article only covers
legislative and judicial developments arising under Georgia state law during the survey
period.
3. Ga. H.R. Bill 173, Reg. Sess., 2009 Ga. Laws 231 (codified at O.C.G.A. §§ 13-8-2, -50
to -59 (2010)).
4. Id. ("To amend Chapter 8 of Title 13 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ... ;
to provide for the enforcement of contracts that restrict or prohibit competition in certain
commercial agreements; to provide for the judicial enforcement of such provisions; [and]
to provide for the modification of such provisions . . . .").
5. Carl Cannon, W. Wright Mitchell & Alyssa Peters Morris, Client Bulletin #427:
Georgians Vote to Make Restrictive Covenants Easier to Enforce, CONSTANGY.COM (Nov. 5,
2010), http//www.constangy.com/communications-305.html.
House Bill 173 states,
This Act shall become effective on the day following the ratification at the time of
the 2010 general election of an amendment to the Constitution of Georgia
providing for the enforcement of covenants in commercial contracts that limit
competition and shall apply to contracts entered into on and after such date and
shall not apply in actions determining the enforceability of restrictive covenants
entered into before such date. If such amendment is not so ratified, then this Act
shall stand automatically repealed.
Ga. H.R. Bill 173 at § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 246.
6. This method of severing certain covenants that are found to be unreasonable while
still enforcing reasonable covenants "is known as'blue penciling.'" R. Robin McDonald, Ga.
Non-Compete Law Is Upheld, FULTON COUNTY DAILY REPORT, June 4,2010, at 1, available
at www.dailyreportonline.com.
7. Ga. H.R. Bill 173 at § 3, 2009 Ga. Laws at 243 (codified at O.C.GA. § 13-8-54
(2010)). House Bill 173 provides in part,
[1]f a court finds that a contractually specified restraint does not comply with
[certain provisions of the O.C.GA], then the court may modify the restraint
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guidelines for determining such covenants' enforceability.' Currently,
while Georgia law recognizes covenants not to compete in employment
contracts, if any covenant in a contract is unenforceable, then all
remaining covenants in the same contract are unenforceable.
In 1991 the Georgia Supreme Court invalidated a statute that allowed
judicial modification of covenants not to compete on the ground that the
statute defeated or lessened competition or encouraged monopolies in
violation of the Georgia Constitution. 0 Tb prevent House Bill 173 from
encountering similar constitutional problems, Georgia voters voted on a
referendum to amend the constitution, which provides for the enforceSince the
ment of restrictive covenants in commercial contracts.'
effective
173
became
amendment was ratified on November 2, House Bill
the following day on November 3, 2010, as opposed to being automatically repealed.' 2

provision and grant only the relief reasonably necessary to protect [legitimate
business interests established by the person seeking enforcement] and to achieve
the original intent of the contracting parties to the extent possible.
Id.
8. See id. at § 3, 2009 Ga. Laws at 242, 244-45 (codified at O.C.GA §§ 13-8-53, -55
to -58 (2010)).
9. Ward v. Process Control Corp., 247 Ga. 583,584,277 S.E.2d 671,673 (1981) ("If any
covenant not to compete within a given employment contract is unreasonable either in
time, territory, or prohibited business activity, then all covenants not to compete within
the same employment contract are unenforceable.").
10. Jackson & Coker, Inc. v. Hart, 261 Ga. 371, 372, 405 S.E.2d 253, 254 (1991)
(invalidating O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(g)(1) (Supp. 1990), repealed by Ga. H.R. Bill 173 at I 2,
2009 Ga. Laws at 232). The statute provided as follows:
Every court of competent jurisdiction shall enforce through any appropriate
remedy every contract in partial restraint of trade that is not against the policy
of the law or otherwise unlawful. In the absence of extreme hardship on the part
of the person or entity bound by such restraint, injunctive relief shall be presumed
to be an appropriate remedy for the enforcement of contracts described in
subsections (b) through (d) of this Code section. If any portion of such restraint
is against the policy of the law in any respect but such restraint, considered as a
whole, is not so clearly unreasonable . . . as to be unconscionable, the court shall
enforce so much of such restraint as it determines by a preponderance of the
evidence to be necessary to protect the interests of the parties that benefit from
such restraint. Such a restraint shall be subject to partial enforcement, whether
or not it contains a severability or similar clause and regardless of whether the
unlawful aspects of such restraint are facially severable from those found lawful.
O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(gXl) (Supp. 1990). In 1991 the supreme court invalidated O.C.GA.
§ 13-8-2.1(gXl) (Supp. 1990). Hart,261 Ga. at 372,405 S.E.2d at 254. However, O.C.GA
§ 13-8-2.1(gX1) remained codified, see O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(gXl) (Supp. 2009), until it was
repealed by House Bill 173. Ga. H.R. Bill 173 at § 2, 2009 Ga. Laws at 232.
11. See Ga. H.R. Bill 173 at § 4, 2009 Ga. Laws at 246.
12. See id.
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B. Alterations to Self-Insurers Guaranty Rust Fund
On May 20, 2010, the Georgia General Assembly passed an Act that
makes a number of alterations to the Self-Insurers Guaranty Trust Fund
(Fund) for workers' compensation.'a The Act amends chapter 9 of title
34 of the O.C.G.A." in numerous ways, 5 including the consequential
changes discussed below.
New participants in the Fund will be assessed $8000 as opposed to
$4000 for their enrollment year."e Additional changes for Fund
participants include a heightened threshold for maximum annual
assessments," heightened minimums of surety bonds or lines of credit
that self-insurers must carry,"8 and a reduction in the benchmark
amount when a self-insured employer becomes subject to special
assessment by the State Board of Workers' Compensation."i

13. Ga. H.R. Bill 1101, Reg. Sess., 2010 Ga. Laws 126 (codified at O.C.GA. §§ 34-9-12,
-106, -127, -380 to -389 (Supp. 2010)).
14. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 9 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
15. Id. House Bill 1101 states that its purpose is
It~o amend Chapter 9 of Title 34 of the [O.C.GA} ... .; to provide for the entry and
execution ofjudgment upon final orders and decisions regarding the Self-insurers
Guaranty Trust Fund; to modify the notification period for revocation of a
certificate of self-insurance; to revise provisions relative to the Self-insurers
Guaranty Trust Fund; ... to provide for related matters; to repeal conflicting
laws; and for other purposes.
Id.

16. Id. at § 4,2010 Ga. Laws at 128 (codified at O.C.G.A. § 34-9-386(aX2) (Supp. 2010)).
17. Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-386(a)(3) (Supp. 2010)) ("The maximum amount of
annual assessments under this paragraph . .. in any calendar year against a participant
shall be $8,000.00"-an increase from $4000).
18. Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-386(b)(2) (Supp. 2010)) ("All active participants shall
be required to maintain surety bonds or the board of trustees may, in its discretion, accept
any irrevocable letter of credit or other acceptable forms of security in the amount of no
less than $250,000"-an increase from $100,000).
19. Id. (codified at O.C.GA § 34-9-386(a)(4) (Supp. 2010)) ("If the fund is reduced to
an amount below $5 million [-down from $7 million-] net of all liabilities as the result
of the payment of claims, the administration of claims, or the costs of administration of the
fund, the board of trustees may levy a special assessment against participants upon
approval by the board. . . .").
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PENDING LEGISIATION

Random Drug Testing of Unemployment InsuranceRecipients
Georgia House Bill 1 3 8 9 ," which has yet to be brought to a vote in
the House, proposes an amendment to chapter 8 of title 34 of the
O.C.G.A.21 to allow random drug testing of recipients of unemployment
benefits."
If enacted, the law would require those who apply for
unemployment benefits to "submit at least once per year to the
Commissioner's random drug testing program." The law would deny
unemployment insurance benefits to any claimant who fails a drug test
and upon failure of a second drug test would bar the recipient from any
further receipt of benefits for two years.'
A

B.

Use of Credit Score in Hiringand Retention Decisions
Georgia House Bill 1277,"s which also has yet to be brought before
the House for a vote, proposes an amendment to chapter 1 of title 34 of
the O.C.G.A.26 prohibiting an employer's use of a credit score or report
in the hiring and discharge of employees.27 There is an exemption
outlined in the bill for occupations in which credit information "directly
relates to a bona fide occupational qualification."'

C. Unemployment Insurance Credit for Hiringof Unemployment
Benefit Recipient
If approved by the U.S. Department of Labor, Georgia House Bill
1 0 2 3 ' will enact the Jobs, Opportunity, and Business Success Act of
2010.0 The bill will amend title 34 of the O.C.G.A. 3 ' to provide
employers with a credit against employer contributions to unemployment
20. Ga. H.R. Bill 1389, Reg. Sess. (2010) (unenacted).
21. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 8 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
22. Ga. H.R. Bill 1389.
23. Id. at § 1.
24. Id.
25. Ga. H.R. Bill 1277, Reg. Sess. (2010) (unenacted).
26. O.C.G.A. tit. 34, ch. 1 (2008).
27. Ga. H.R Bill 1277 at § 1 ("It shall be unlawful for an employer to fail or refuse to
hire, bar, discharge from employment, or otherwise discriminate against an individual
because of the individual's credit history or credit report . . .
28. Id.
29. Ga. H.R Bill 1023, Reg. Seas. (2010) (as passed by House, Mar. 26, 2010, and the
Senate, Apr. 1, 2010).
30. Id.
31. O.C.G.A. tit. 34 (2008 & Supp. 2010).
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insurance if the employer hires an eligible recipient of unemployment
insurance.32 This credit will be known as the Georgia Works Tax
Credit.' An employer is eligible for credit when an individual who is
hired is a recipient of weekly unemployment insurance benefits, has
been profiled by the Georgia Department of Labor as one who is likely
to exhaust benefits, has no prospect or promise of future employment,
and "[hias at least eight weeks of benefit eligibility remaining on his or
her current claim at the time" of employment.' However, the bill was
vetoed on June 4, 2010, so it must now undergo the process for
reconsideration."
IV. WRONGFUL TERMINATION

Employment at Will

A.

1. Overview. At-will employment refers to employment that either
an employer or an employee may terminate at any time with or without
cause.' Employment at will in other jurisdictions may be weakening," but in Georgia the presumption remains that all employment is
at will unless a statutory or contractual exception exists." "[T]his bar
to wrongful discharge claims in the at-will employment context 'is a
fundamental statutory rule governing employer-employee relations in
Particularly, O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 0 provides that "[ain
Georgia."

32. Ga. H.R. Bill 1023.
33. Id. at § 1.
If this paragraph becomes effective, . . . there shall be a credit to be known as the
Georgia Works Tax Credit. The amount of the credit shall be not less than $25.00
and not more than $125.00 per individual employee per calendar quarter ....
The credit may be claimed by an employer for up to four calendar quarters for
each individual hired by that employer for services to be performed in this state
Id.
34. Id.
35. Georgia General Assembly, HB 1023, LEGIS.GA.GOV. (Oct. 13, 2010), 1:45 AM),
http/A/www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009-10/sum/hbl023.htm. For the status of House Bill 1023,
see http//www.legis.ga.gov/legis/2009-10/sum/hbl023.htm.
36. BLACK's IAW DIcTIONARY 604 (9th ed. 2009).
37. Haas, supra note 1, at 216 & n.14 ("(TJhe employment-at-will doctrine is
weakening in many jurisdictions.").
38. E.g., Wilson v. City of Sardis, 264 Ga. App. 178, 179, 590 S.E.2d 383, 385 (2003)
("In the absence of a contractual or statutory 'for cause' requirement, . . . the employee
serves 'at will' and may be discharged at any time for any reason or no reason. . . .").
39. Reid v. City of Albany, 276 Ga. App. 171, 172, 622 S.E.2d 875, 877 (2005) (quoting
Reilly v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 272 Ga. 279, 280, 528 S.E.2d 238, 240 (2000)).
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indefinite hiring" is at-will employment." The definition of an indefinite hiring includes contract provisions specifying "'permanent employment,' 'employment for life,' [and] 'employment until retirement.' n42
Further, a contract specifying an annual salary does not create a definite
period of employment.' However, if an employment contract does
specify a definite period of employment, any employment beyond that
period becomes employment at will subject to discharge without
cause."
Regardless of an employer's motives, the general rule in Georgia
allows the discharge of an at-will employee without creating a cause of
action for wrongful termination." Oral promises between an employer
and an employee will not modify the relationship between the two;
absent a written contract, an employee's status remains at will. 46

2.

Elements of Employer-Employee Contracts. During the

survey period, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh
Circuit addressed just how strictly courts construe the employment-atwill doctrine in Georgia. In H&R Block Eastern Enterprises,Inc. v.
Morris,"' the Eleventh Circuit addressed the requirements necessary
to transcend the default employment-at-will doctrine." In Morris the
plaintiff received a letter on October 31, 2005, addressed "Dear
Associate," inviting her to attend orientation for the 2006 tax season.49
Morris's previous employment periods with Block were governed by
separate agreements." Morris argued that the letter constituted an
employment contract for the 2006 tax season."
The Eleventh Circuit held that the letter's language was not sufficient
to create an employment contract, stating, "Employment contracts are

40. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-1 (2008).
41. Id.
42. Ga. Power Co. v. Busbin, 242 Ga. 612, 613, 250 S.E.2d 442, 443-44 (1978).
43. Ikemiya v. Shibamoto Am., Inc., 213 Ga. App. 271, 273,444 S.E.2d 351,353 (1994)
(quoting Gatins v. NCR Corp., 180 Ga. App. 595, 597, 349 S.E.2d 818, 820 (1986)).
44. Schuck v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 244 Ga. App. 147, 148,534 S.E.2d 533,
534 (2000).
45. H&R Block E. Enters., Inc. v. Morris, 606 F.3d 1285, 1294(11th Cir. 2010) (quoting
Nida v. Echols, 31 F. Supp. 2d 1358, 1376 (N.D. Ga. 1998)); Fink v. Dodd, 286 Ga. App.
363, 365, 649 S.E.2d 359, 362 (2007) (alteration in original) ("The employer[] with or
without cause and regardless of its motives may discharge the employee without liability.").
46. Balmer v. Elan Corp., 278 Ga. 227, 228-29, 599 S.E.2d 158, 161 (2004).
47. 606 F.3d 1285 (11th Cir. 2010).
48. Id. at 1294.
49. Id. at 1289 (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Id. at 1288.
51. See id. at 1294.
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enforceable under Georgia law only if they include '[tihe nature and
character of the services to be performed, the place of employment[,] and
the amount of compensation to be paid.'"" In Morris's case, the letter
established none of these factors; the letter even failed to address the
employee specifically, as it was addressed "Associate." The Eleventh
Circuit held, therefore, that the letter did not create an enforceable
contract and that the employment-at-will doctrine controlled Morris's
employee status, invalidating her wrongful termination claim."
In Goddard v. City of Albany,' the Georgia Supreme Court elaborat-

ed on the policy enunciated in Morris. In Goddard a city employee filed
wrongful termination charges based on the presumption that the
employer's progressive disciplinary policy created an implied contract."
The supreme court held that the progressive disciplinary policy was
insufficient to establish that her employment was not at will. 7
Further, nothing else in the record showed that the employee had been
hired "for a definite term of employment and, as such, her employment
was at-will.""8
Goddard, the city employee, also argued that an oral promise giving
her "a year to prove herself' established a contract under the doctrine of
promissory estoppel.69 In addition to holding that Goddard failed to
establish an essential element of promissory estoppel,' the supreme
court stated that "at-will employees cannot enforce oral promises."
Accordingly, the supreme court rejected the wrongful termination
claim."
3. Exceptions to the At-Will Doctrine. The statute creating the
at-will doctrine does account for specific exceptions.6 When employ-

52. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Farr v. Barnes Freight Lines, Inc., 97 Ga. App.
36, 37, 101 S.E.2d 906, 907 (1958)).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 285 Ga. 882, 684 S.E.2d 635 (2009).
56. Id. at 885, 684 S.E.2d at 640.
57. Id. ("[Plersonnel policies and practices are legally insufficient to create an implied
contract for a definite term of employment.").
58. Id.
59. Id. at 886, 684 S.E.2d at 640.
60. See id.; see also O.C.G.A. § 13-3-44(a) (2010) ("A promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third
person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.").
61. Id.
62. See id. at 885-86, 684 S.E.2d at 640.
63. See O.C.GA § 34-7-1.
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ment is not at will, the most typical way to sue an employer for
termination of employment requires a breach of contract." However,
during the survey period, the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Georgia assessed in Hamilton v. CarecoreNational,
LLC," whether a claim could be brought under the theory of quantum
meruit." In Hamilton the plaintiffs filed suit for wages and overtime
pay that the plaintiffs claimed their employer owed for work completed
under an employment contract.67 Carecore, the employer, responded
that at-will employees cannot enforce a promise by the employer.68 In
determining whether to allow the plaintiffs to amend their complaint,
the district court noted that '[wihere a plaintiff has completed work
pursuant to an at-will employment contract, a defendant can be sued to
enforce promises made concerning completed work."69 However, at-will
employees may only sue for work completed at the time of the breach,
not for future compensation owed under the promise."o
B. Breach of Contract (Otherthan At-Will Contracts)
1. Overview. The basic rules of contract law apply in creating a
valid employment contract: competency to contract, offer, acceptance,
and valid consideration." Further, for an employment contract to be
valid, the terms must define the nature and character of the services to
be performed, the place of employment, the time period for which the
employee is to work, and the compensation to be owed to the employee. 72 In addition, an employment contract's enforceability requires
sufficient definitiveness in the terms of the contract.73

64.

See JAMEs W. WIMBERLY, Jn., GEORGIA EMPLOYMENT LAW 46 (4th ed. 2008).

No. CV409-116, 2010 WL 768179 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 4, 2010).
See id. at *1.
Id.
Id. at *2.
69. Id.
70. Id. (quoting Yearwood v. S. Life Sys., Inc., 243 Ga. App. 348, 350, 531 S.E.2d 741,
743 (2000)) ("It is true an employee cannot sue to enforce future performance of a
terminable-at-will employment agreement. However, an employee may sue ... for the
amount of compensation due him, based upon services actually performed by him up to the
time of his discharge.").
71. WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 6.
72. Id. For a discussion of elements of employer-employee contracts, see supra Part
IVA2 of this Article.
65.
66.
67.
68.

73.

WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 6.
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2. Continued Employment As Consideration Supporting
Subsequent Agreement. In BDI Laguna Holdings, Inc. v. Marsh,74
the Georgia Court of Appeals considered the question of if and when an
individual might be additionally compensated for work that he or she
already contracted to perform.' BDI Distributors (BDI) approached
and hired Marsh to help grow the business. BDI and Marsh executed
a contract for renewable five-year terms in exchange for specified
The agreement additionally provided "that BDI
compensation. 6
Distributors, 'in the sole and absolute discretion of the Chief Executive
Officer . . ., may pay additional incentive compensation or bonuses.'"
After acquiring a new company and consolidating, BDI management
orally promised to provide Marsh with stock. Subsequently, Marsh
received a letter to similar effect.
Following the merger, BDI restructured and replaced its CEO. The
new CEO decided not to give Marsh the stock that was initially
promised both orally and by letter. After the date the stock was to be
delivered, BDI failed to provide Marsh with his 2% of the shares, and
Marsh sought damages for breach of contract. The superior court ruled
in Marsh's favor on the breach of contract claims and awarded him the
value of the stock.7 ' BDI appealed, contending that the agreement
"was unenforceable due to a lack of consideration.'
BDI primarily contended that "Marsh was already obligated under his
[original] employment contract to perform duties allegedly supporting
the promise of stock."' The court of appeals held that in circumstances
when two parties agree to the terms of a contract, any additional
compensation will be considered a gift.' Had the stock promise been
incorporated into the original agreement, the promise would have been
enforceable.'

74. 301 Ga. App. 656, 689 S.E.2d 39 (2009).
75. See id. at 656, 689 S.E.2d at 41.
76. Id. at 656-57, 689 S.E.2d at 41.
77. Id. at 657, 689 S.E.2d at 41.
78. Id. at 657, 689 S.E.2d at 41-42 (explaining that Marsh received a letter notifying
him that the merger had been completed and that the shareholders agreed to provide
Marsh with 2% of the stock of the company).
79. Id. at 657-58, 689 S.E.2d at 42.
80. Id. at 658, 689 S.E.2d at 42.
81. Id.
82. Id. (quoting Mgmt. Search, Inc. v. Morgan, 136 Ga. App. 651, 653, 222 S.E.2d 154,
157 (1975)).
83. Id. at 659, 689 S.E.2d at 42 (assuming that all other elements of a valid contract
have been met and that the language is acceptably definitive).
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Marsh argued that his continued service and willingness to take on
additional duties and responsibility provided a sufficient basis for the
superior court's holding." However, the court looked to the plain
language of the contract.' The contract required Marsh to
devote his entire working time, attention, skill and energies exclusively
to the Business of the Company [BDI]. . . . If Marsh is elected as a
director of the Company or as a director or officer of any of its
affiliates, the Employee will fulfill his duties as such director or officer
without additional compensation."
Because the court perceives additional compensation to be a "mere
gratuity,"' and because the plain language of the contract reinforced
the position that Marsh received all that BDI promised through the
originally agreed-upon compensation,' the court held that Marsh's
continued service constituted "part of his original employment contract."8 9
In Marsh the court also discussed the doctrine of merger.' Marsh
claimed that the former CEO of BDI made oral representations to give
him the stock."' However, the court stated that "it has long been the
law in Georgia that if the parties have reduced their agreement to
writing, all oral representations made antecedent to execution of the
written contract are merged into and extinguished by the contract."'
When a contract incorporates a merger clause, all "prior and contemporaneous" assertions and promises are incorporated as well.' Therefore,
the original agreement bound Marsh to his initial compensation, and the

84. Id. at 659, 689 S.E.2d at 43.
85. Id. at 659,689 S.E.2d at 42-43 (quoting First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792,
794, 546 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2001)) ("Whenever the language of a contract is plain,
unambiguous, and capable of only one reasonable interpretation, no construction is
required or even permissible, and the contractual language used by the parties must be
afforded its literal meaning.").
86. Id. at 659, 689 S.E.2d at 43 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
87. Id. at 658, 689 S.E.2d at 42.
88. Id. at 659, 689 S.E.2d at 43.
89. Id. at 658-60, 689 S.E.2d at 42-43.
90. See id. at 661, 689 S.E.2d at 44.
91. Id. at 657, 662, 689 S.E.2d at 45.
92. Id. at 663, 689 S.E.2d at 45 (quoting First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792,
794, 546 S.E.2d 781, 784 (2001)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
93. See id. (quoting First Data POS, Inc. v. Willis, 273 Ga. 792, 794-95, 546 S.E.2d 781,
784 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted) ("In written contracts containing a merger
clause, prior or contemporaneous representations that contradict the written contract
cannot be used to vary the terms of a valid written agreement purporting to contain the
entire agreement of the parties . . . .").
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letter failed to amend the agreement by promising him additional
compensation in stock.'

3. Material lermy-Severability of Contract Provisions. To
form a valid contract, the parties must assent to all the terms of the
contract.' In Georgia, "[ilt is well settled that an agreement between
two parties will occur only when the minds of the parties meet at the
same time, upon the same subject-matter, and in the same sense."
However, a meeting of the minds is necessary only if the provision in
question is material to the contract.9 7
In Murphy v. Hosanna Youth Facilities, Inc.," the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia considered whether
the parties' agreement to enter into a separate noncompetition agreement, as provided in the parties' written employment contract, was a
Hosanna Youth Facilities, Inc.'s
material term of that contract."
(Hosanna) CFO hired his daughter and her husband, Zuri and Jeric
Murphy, to manage a new location. From the outset, the Murphys
requested employment agreements securing their positions. A month
after the Murphys signed and submitted what they believed to be their
final contracts with Hosanna, they were demoted and soon resigned their
positions."* Although the exact terms of the contract were disputed,
both parties agreed that they did not enter into separate noncompetition
agreements as provided in their employment contracts."0 ' The Murphys subsequently brought an action seeking damages for breach of contract. 02

94. Id. at 661,689 S.E.2d at 44 ("Marsh's compensation was governed by the language
of his employment agreement . ... The June 16 letter, to the extent that it was
sufficiently definite, was not an amendment to the employment agreement . . . .").
95. O.C.G.A. § 13-3-2 (2010) ("The consent of the parties being essential to a contract,
until each has assented to all the terms, there is no binding contract. . . .").
96. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 250 Ga. 391, 395, 297 S.E.2d
733, 737 (1982).
97. See King v. Comfort Living, Inc., 287 Ga. App. 337, 339, 651 S.E.2d 484, 487
(2007) (quoting Jerry Dickerson Presents, Inc. v. Concert/Southern Chastain Promotions,
260 Ga. App. 316, 328, 579 S.E.2d 761, 771(2003)) (emphasizing that "[ilf the parties have
not agreed to an essential term, 'no meeting of the minds ... exists'").
98. 683 F. Supp. 2d 1304 (N.D. Ga. 2010).
99. See id. at 1313.
100. Id at 1306-09.
101. Id. at 1313 (noting that plaintiffs conceded they had not agreed to any restrictive
covenants).
102. Id. at 1309.
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Hosanna responded that absent a severability provision, a party's
failure to agree to a material term renders the contract unenforceable." As provided in O.C.G.A § 13-1-8,"'
(a) A contract may be either entire or severable. In an entire contract,
the whole contract stands or falls together. In a severable contract, the
failure of a distinct part does not void the remainder. (b) The character
of the contract in such case is determined by the intention of the
parties.es
The parties may express an intention for severability either directly or
indirectly."
The district court concluded that when an agreement
intends to have a provision separately drafted, that provision is
severable, and the rest of the employment contract may be valid.o"
Thus, the district court held:
[I]n cases involving the issue of severability, where an instrument in
writing, purporting to be a bilateral contract, contains mutual
promises, which without more and when taken independently of certain
subsidiary provisions in the instrument would render the instrument
valid as a contract, such subsidiary provisions will not, unless their
terms imperatively demand it, be given a construction that will nuflify
and completely destroy the entire obligations of either party under the
instrument and thus render the instrument lacking in mutuality and
void."o
Failure to execute a nonmaterial ancillary agreement will not defeat a
contract's validity if its severable promises, as well as consideration for
those promises, are enforceable absent the clause or provision that the
parties agreed to add.10

103. Id. at 1313.
104. O.C.G.A. § 13-1-8 (2010).
105. Id.
106. Murphy, 683 F. Supp. 2d at 1313 (quoting Grove v. Sugar Hill Inv. Assocs., Inc.,
219 Ga. App. 781, 786, 466 S.E.2d 901, 906 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted)

(noting that although a direct expression of an intent to make the provisions severable may
be formed by including a severability clause, an indirect expression may be found "when
[a] contract contains promises to do several things based upon multiple considerations").
107. Id. at 1314 (citing Toneee, Inc. v. Thomas, 219 Ga. App. 539, 541, 466 S.E.2d 27,
30 (1995)).
108. Id. at 1314-15 (alteration in original) (quoting Toncee, Inc. v. Thomas, 219 Ga.
App. 539, 541, 466 S.E.2d 27, 30 (1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
109. See id. at 1315 (expressing that the contract called for the execution of a separate
noncompetition agreement and that failure to formulate that agreement did not prove fatal
to the intention to be bound by the rest of the agreement).
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4. Termination for "Cause." Under an employment agreement
that requires cause for dismissal, an employer who terminates an
employee without cause may incur liability for breach of contract.'o
In the educational context, the employer is bound by the statutory
definition of "cause" described in O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940... for dismissing
an educational professional.112
In Chattooga County Board of Education v. Searels,"' the employer
fired Searels, a special education teacher, for "insubordination, willful
The
neglect of duties, and 'other good and sufficient cause.'""
superior court reversed the State Board of Education's affirmation of
sufficient cause, and the local board appealed to the Georgia Court of
Appeals."s Georgia courts define the term "insubordinate conduct" as
"willful disobedience" and the term "willful neglect" as "a flagrant act or
omission, intentional violation of a known rule or policy, or a continuous
course of reprehensible conduct."" Using these definitions, the court
of appeals reversed the superior court and affirmed Searels's dismissal."' Even after warnings, Searels spoke derogatorily of her handicapped students,"s repeatedly violated the dress code," 9 and discussed her opinion that another handicapped student did not have a
future because "he would ... be dead before he was 21."'20 The court

of appeals noted that while "good and sufficient cause" had not been
defined, Searels's actions violated all sections charged against her,
justifying the dismissal of Searels as an employee.' 2'
110, Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. v. Nulph, 265 Ga. 662, 662-63, 460 S.E.2d
792, 793 (1995) ("[When . .. the employer fires the employee without cause, a substantive
breach occurs, and the employee would be entitled to seek full compensatory damages.").
111. O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940 (2009).
112. Id. § 20-2-940(a). ("[A] contract for a definite term may be terminated or
suspended for . .. [ilnsubordination; . .. [wlillful neglect of duties; ...

or [a]ny other good

and suflicient cause.").
113. 302 Ga. App. 731, 691 S.E.2d 629 (2010).
114. Id. at 731-32, 691 S.E.2d at 630; see also O.C.G.A. § 20-2-940(a)(2)-(3), (8).
115. 302 Ga. App. at 732, 691 S.E.2d at 630.
116. Id. at 734, 691 S.E.2d at 632 (quoting Brawner v. Marietta City Bd. of Educ., 285
Ga. App. 10, 12, 646 S.E.2d 89, 91 (2007); Terry v. Houston Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 178 Ga.
App. 296, 299, 342 S.E.2d 774, 776 (1986)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id.
118. See id at 732, 691 S.E.2d at 631 ("Searels left a note ... indicating that the
teacher and another staff member 'can put my students into ANY elective class-no matter
how advanced-except PE-because they cannot do ANY of it anyway.'").
119. Id. at 732-33, 691 S.E.2d at 631 ("[She] violated the dress code because the skirt's
length was too short.... Searels's v-neck shirt exposed her bra and breasts.").
120. Id. at 732, 691 S.E.2d at 631 (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. Id. at 734, 691 S.E.2d at 632.
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Unemployment Insurance

An employee who is discharged from employment is generally eligible
to temporarily receive unemployment insurance for the time during
which the individual's unemployment persists. 22 In Georgia, "unemployment through no fault of the unemployed individual remains the
touchstone for eligibility for benefits."'" The intention of the statute
is to promote employment security by requiring employers to contribute
to the fund, covering the expenses of the unemployed."2 '
During the survey period, in Davane v. Thurmond,15 the court of
appeals considered what factors constituted a disqualification of
2 " Eagle Creek Software Service, Inc. (Eagle Creek) terminatbenefits."
ed Davane's employment for failure to confirm her availability for an
out-of-town assignment. Eagle Creek originally hired Davane for a
position that required her to travel; however, after problems acquiring
and keeping a nanny, the company reassigned her to a temporary
position that allowed her to work from home. Subsequently, Eagle
Creek informed Davane of an assignment in Kansas City, Missouri, but
failed to provide a starting date, resulting in Davane's not becoming
aware of the specific start date until five days before the project
began." Davane immediately attempted to acquire child care, but she
failed to do so and was fired two days later."
Davane filed for
unemployment insurance but was denied by the Department of Labor,
and she appealed the decision. 29
According to Georgia law, an employee may be disqualified from
unemployment insurance "after the individual has been discharged or
suspended from work with the most recent employer for failure to obey
orders, rules, or instructions or for failure to discharge the duties for
which the individual was employed.""
However, disqualification
requires some form of intentional fault on behalf of the individual.''

122. See generally O.C.G.A. § 34-8-2 (2008) (declaring that state public policy is in favor
of providing unemployment benefits).
123. WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 308-09.
124. See O.C.G.A. § 34-8-150(a) (2008); see also O.C.G.A. § 34-8-2.
125. 300 Ga. App. 474, 685 S.E.2d 446 (2009).
126. Id. at 474-78, 685 S.E.2d at 447-50.
127. Id. at 474-76, 685 S.E.2d at 447-48.
128. Id. at 477, 685 S.E.2d at 449 ("She began the process of arranging for child care,
but was terminated only two days after receiving notice of the project's start date.").
129. Id. at 474, 685 S.E.2d at 447.
130. O.C.G.A. § 34-8-194(2XA) (2008).
131. Davane, 300 Ga. App. at 476, 685 S.E.2d at 449 (quoting Jamal v. Thurmond, 263
Ga. App. 320,321,587 S.E.2d 809,811 (2003)) ([Disqualification is not appropriate unless
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Because Davane made a "bona fide" attempt to comply with the wishes
of her employer, the evidence conflicted with the finding of fault."as
Additionally, the court required that to be disqualified for unemployment benefits, an employee must "reasonably expect, under all the
circumstances of employment, that sanction would result from a
violation."133 Because Davane was neither removed from her temporary position nor informed of a transition back to the permanent position
that Eagle Creek originally hired her for, the court found it unconscionable to expect Davane to anticipate being sanctioned for failure to confirm
her availability within two days of being informed of the date of the
Overall, "Georgia law allows [an employer] nearly free
assignment."
rein as far as the firing is concerned, but not as far as payment of
unemployment compensation benefits ... is concerned."' 3
V. NEGLIGENT HIRING OR RETENTION

A

Overview

Under O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20,'36 "[tihe employer is bound to exercise
ordinary care in the selection of employees and not to retain them after
knowledge of incompetency.""3 ' The court of appeals has held that this
statute imposes a duty on the employer to "warn other employees of
dangers incident to employment that 'the employer knows or ought to
know but which are unknown to the employee.'"'a For a plaintiff to
sustain an action for negligent hiring or retention, the plaintiff must
show that the employer employed an individual who "the employer knew
or should have known posed a risk of harm to others where it [was]
reasonably foreseeable from the employee's tendencies or propensities
that the employee could cause the type of harm sustained by the
Typically, "the determination of whether an employer
plaintiff."a

the employer shows the 'discharge was caused by the deliberate, conscious fault of the
claimant.'").
132. Id. at 477, 685 S.E.2d at 449.
133. Id. (quoting Barron v. Poythress, 219 Ga. App. 775, 777, 466 S.E.2d 665, 667
(1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
134. See id. at 477-78, 685 S.E.2d at 449-50.
135. Id. at 478, 685 S.E.2d at 450.
136. O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20 (2008).
137. Id.
138. Tecumseh Prods. Co. v. Rigdon, 250 Ga. App. 739,740,552 S.E.2d 910,912 (2001);
see also O.C.G.A. § 34-7-20.
139. Munroe v. Universal Health Servs., Inc., 277 Ga. 861, 863, 596 S.E.2d 604, 606
(2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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used ordinary care in hiring an employee is a jury issue"u" and is only
a question of law "where the evidence is plain, palpable and undisputable."141
B. Lack of Evidence of PriorMisconduct
During the survey period, the court of appeals held in Georgia
Messenger Service, Inc. v. Bradley4 2 that for a defendant to be held
responsible for claims of negligent hiring or retention, the plaintiff must
show that the defendant knew or should have known of the dangerous
propensities that allegedly caused the plaintiffs injuries or damages.1 43
In Georgia Messenger Service, an employee of defendant GMS, John
Wise, parked his delivery truck in a restricted zone of the office park
where plaintiff Vernetta Bradley worked as a security guard and ran
inside to quickly deliver a package. When Wise returned to his truck,
Bradley was in the process of placing a "boot" on his vehicle.'" This
action so enraged Wise that he "kicked Bradley into unconsciousness,
removed the 'boot,' and presumably continued on his scheduled
deliveries.."4

The trial court denied GMS's motion for summary judgment against
Bradley, and GMS appealed. 4 6 In addressing the negligent hiring and
retention and negligent entrustment claims, the court of appeals
reversed the trial court's summary judgment ruling, holding that "the
undisputed evidence . . . is that GMS had no prior knowledge of any

dangerous propensities of Wise, who had worked without incident for
GMS for over nine years.' 4
C.

Unknown Medical Illness
During the survey period, the court of appeals held in Drury v. Harris
Ventures, Inc." that under Georgia law, liability for negligent hiring
or retention will not attach when an employer hiring temporary day
laborers relies on information supplied by an employee on an employ-

140. Tecumseh Prods. Co., 250 Ga. App. at 741, 552 S.E.2d at 912.
141. Munroe, 277 Ga. at 864, 596 S.E.2d at 607 (quoting Robinson v. Kroger Co., 268
Ga. 735, 739, 493 S.E.2d 403, 408 (1997)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
142. 302 Ga. App. 247, 690 S.E.2d 888 (2010).
143. Id. at 250, 690 S.E.2d at 891 (quoting S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Sharara, 167 Ga.
App. 665, 666, 307 S.E.2d 129, 130 (1983)).
144. Id. at 247-48, 690 S.E.2d at 889 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145. Id. at 248, 690 S.E.2d at 889.
146. Id. at 248, 690 S.E.2d at 890.
147. Id. at 250, 690 S.E.2d at 891.
148. 302 Ga. App. 545, 691 S.E.2d 356 (2010).

MERCER LAW REVIEW

198

[Vol. 62

ment application."' In Drury an employee of Harris Ventures (d/b/a
Staff Zone), Reginald Holmes, attacked Teresa Drury while working in
her yard. Before the incident, Drury's husband contacted Staff Zone,
requesting two workers to pull weeds in his yard. Mr. Drury emphasized the need for the workers to be suitable to work with his wife while
she was home alone. Holmes failed to disclose on his employment
application that he suffered from schizophrenia and that he no longer
took his doctor-recommended medication."W
The court held that
the relevant question is whether [Staff Zone] knew or in the exercise
of ordinary care should have known that [Holmes], the employee it
hired and retained to perform duties involving personal contact with
[Drury], was unsuitable for that position because he posed a reasonably
foreseeable risk of personal harm to [people in Drury's position].' 5'
Staff Zone required its applicants to fill out an application that inquired
into the applicant's criminal history, mental illnesses, psychological
treatment, and known disabilities. Holmes did not answer these
questions truthfully." Accordingly, the court ruled that liability could
not attach to his employer and reasoned that "[tlo require an employer
to independently verify each area of possible error on the application
would render employment decisions in even the most basic settings
untenably fraught with potential liability.""'
VI.

A.

RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR

Overview

Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer may be held
vicariously liable for the negligence or intentional torts committed by his
To hold an
or her employee within the scope of employment.'"
employer vicariously liable for the torts of an employee, the court must
find the following two elements: (1) the employee was acting in
furtherance of the employer's business, and (2) the employee was acting
within the scope of the employer's business."a

149. Id. at 549, 691 S.E.2d at 360.
150. Id. at 545-46, 691 S.E.2d at 357-58.
151. Id. at 548, 691 S.E.2d at 359 (alterations in original) (quoting Munroe, 277 Ga. at
863, 596 S.E.2d at 606) (internal quotation marks omitted).
152. Id. at 546, 691 S.E.2d at 357.
153. Id. at 549, 691 S.E.2d at 359.
154. CHARLEs R. ADAMS III, GEORGIA LAW OF TORTs 270 (2009-2010 ed.).
155. Id. at 272.
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B. Private Enterprise
Under Georgia law,
[ilf a tort is committed by an employee not by reason of the employment, but because of matters disconnected therewith, the employer is
not liable. Furthermore, [ilf a tortious act is committed not in
furtherance of the employer's business, but rather for purely personal
reasons disconnected from the authorized business of the master, the
master is not liable."
During the survey period, the court of appeals held in Leo v. Waffle
House, Inc." that the employer was not liable for the actions of its
employees because the employees' actions that led up to the tortious
injury were not in furtherance of the business of the employer. a Leo
involved an incident that occurred during the late night shift at an
Atlanta area Waffle House restaurant. Rex Joseph Leo, a homeless
customer of the restaurant, was drinking coffee as an invitee along with
three other customers. Quinton Wilson was the server on duty while
Crystal Sparks worked the grill." While not a manager, Sparks "was
the person considered to be in charge."'6 Leo, Wilson, and Sparks
were all acquainted with each other through their interactions during
the late shift."e" The incident in question arose when after much
"joking around," Wilson mixed up a concoction of "juice, hot water,
lemons, sugar, Ivory soap, and Score dishwashing detergent into an
apple juice bottle he had purchased from a convenience store earlier that
evening." 62 Wilson told Leo the mixture was a milkshake and that he
would pay Leo five dollars to drink the concoction in the apple juice
bottle. Sparks said, "I wouldn't drink that, Leo, if I were you, but I'm
Unaware of the contents, Leo drank the
not getting involved."'xe
concoction, collapsed on the floor, began foaming at the mouth, and was
hospitalized because of internal injuries from the corrosive dishwasher
detergent.1"4

156. Dowdell v. Krystal Co., 291 Ga. App. 469, 470, 662 S.E.2d 150, 153 (2008)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Piedmont Hosp., Inc. v. Palladino, 276
Ga. 612, 613-14, 580 S.E.2d 215, 217 (2003)).
157. 298 Ga. App. 838, 681 S.E.2d 258 (2009).
158. Id. at 843, 681 S.E.2d at 263.
159. Id. at 839, 681 S.E.2d at 260-61.
160. Id. at 839, 681 S.E.2d at 261.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
164. Id.
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The court of appeals ruled on three issues,'" two of which are of
interest here. The first issue was whether Waffle House was negligent
because its person in charge, Sparks, failed to intervene in the situation.'
The trial court granted summary judgment to Waffle House
The court of appeals ruled that these
regarding the cause of action.'
circumstances created an issue of fact for the jury and reversed the
summary judgment.1" The court reasoned that "[tihe proprietor of a
business has a duty, when he can reasonably apprehend danger to a
customer from the misconduct of other customers or persons on the
premises, to exercise ordinary care to protect the customer from injury
caused by such misconduct.""es
The court of appeals also addressed the issue of whether the trial
court erred in granting summary judgment to Waffle House based on
liability for the incident under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 7 o
The question was whether Wilson acted within the scope of his
employment and in furtherance of the business of Waffle House when he
served Leo the corrosive mixture.''
Liability under respondeat
superior is a question of fact "for determination by the jury, except in
plain and indisputable cases."'7 2 The court of appeals held that in this
case Waffle House indisputably lacked liability under respondeat
superior: "Wilson's act was clearly committed for purely personal
reasons unconnected with his job. Wilson mixed a concoction while
joking around with customers late at night, using his own container and
then dared a customer, indeed offered the customer money, to drink the
substance."'73 Had Wilson not clearly indicated the dubious nature of
the drink or served a drink in a Waffle House cup without any fanfare
or coaxing, then liability would have most likely attached to Waffle
House. However, Wilson acted in his own capacity in interacting with
an acquaintance, and the fact that the interaction in question occurred
at work was not enough to hold Waffle House liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior.

165. Id. at 838, 681 S.E.2d at 260.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 840, 681 S.E.2d at 261 (quoting Shell Oil Co. v. Diehl, 205 Ga. App. 367,
368, 422 S.E.2d 63, 64 (1992)).
170. Id. at 841-42, 681 S.E.2d at 263.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 842,681 S.E.2d at 263 (quoting Bacon v. News-Press & Gazette Co., 188 Ga.
App. 703, 704, 373 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
173. Id. at 842-43, 681 S.E.2d at 263 (footnote omitted).
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C. Employer-Owned Vehicle
Generally, an employee is not acting within the scope of employment
Therefore, an employer is
when commuting to and from work."
generally not vicariously liable for the actions of an employee traveling
However, when an employer owns the vehicle
to or from work."
involved in the tort, the general rule changes:
Where a vehicle is involved in a collision, and it is shown that the
automobile is owned by a person, and that the operator of the vehicle
is in the employment of that person, a presumption arises that the
employee was in the scope of his employment at the time of the
collision, and the burden is then on the defendant employer to show
otherwise.'
The presumption may be overcome by uncontroverted evidence."
In Hicks v. Heard,78 the Georgia Supreme Court considered whether
vicarious liability attaches when a vehicle owned by an employer is not
being driven in furtherance of the employer's business.!9 Jessica
Heard worked as a part-time clerical employee of her father Samuel
Heard, co-owner of Mark Heard Fuel Company. Jessica collided with
another automobile while on her way home from school, which caused
injury to the plaintiff Hicks. Hicks contended that even though Jessica
was driving between school and her home, Heard Fuel was vicariously
liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior because Jessica worked
for Heard Fuel "as needed" and was thus "on-call.""o The trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of Heard Fuel, and the court of
appeals affirmed."8 '
In determining the validity of the summary judgment, the supreme
court looked to the burden-shifting paradigm set forth in Allen Kane's

Major Dodge:

174. Hunter v. Modern Cont'l Constr. Co., 287 Ga. App. 689, 690-91, 652 S.E.2d 583,
584 (2007).
175. Id. at 691, 652 S.E.2d at 584 (quoting Clo White Co. v. Lattimore, 263 Ga. App.
839, 839, 590 S.E.2d 381, 383 (2003)).
176. Allen Kane's Major Dodge, Inc. v. Barnes, 243 Ga. 776, 777, 257 S.E.2d 186, 188
(1979) (quoting W. Point Pepperell, Inc. v. Knowles, 132 Ga. App. 253, 255, 208 S.E.2d 17,
19 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. Id. at 778, 257 S.E.2d at 188.
178. 286 Ga. 864, 692 S.E.2d 360 (2010).
179. Id. at 864, 692 S.E.2d at 361.
180. Id. at 864-65, 692 S.E.2d at 361 (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. Id. at 864, 692 S.E.2d at 361.
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When the uncontradicted testimony of the defendant and/or of the
employee shows that the employee was not acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident, the plaintiff must show ...
some other fact which indicates the employee was acting within the
scope of his employment. If this "other fact" is ... [clircumstantial
evidence, it must be evidence sufficient to support a verdict in order to
withstand the defendant's motion for summary judgment.m2
For circumstantial evidence to meet this burden, the plaintiff must show
that the conclusion proposed is reasonably supported by the facts and
that those facts render all other conclusions less probable." Since
Jessica Heard was in fact driving a company car, and she worked for
that company, there was a presumption of vicarious liability.18'
However, this presumption was rebutted through the uncontroverted
testimony of Jessica and her father, an officer of Heard Fuel." Mr.
Hicks's only evidence-that Jessica was perpetually on-call-was not
sufficient to meet the burden of "renderling] less probable all inconsistent conclusions."" Accordingly, the supreme court upheld the trial
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Heard Fuel.'

D. Independent Contractoror Employee
Vicarious liability under respondeat superior generally does not apply
Therefore, to determine
to the acts of independent contractors."
whether an employer is vicariously liable, a court must initially
determine whether an individual is an independent contractor or an

employee.189
For example, in Adcox v. Atlanta Building Maintenance Co.'9 the
court of appeals considered whether Atlanta Building Maintenance Co.
(ABM) could be held vicariously liable for the negligence of its subcon-

182. Id. at 865-66, 692 S.E.2d at 362 (quoting Allen Kane's Mqjor Dodge, 243 Ga. at
780, 257 S.E.2d at 190).
183. Id. at 866, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
184. Id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 867, 692 S.E.2d at 362-63.
187. Id. at 868, 692 S.E.2d at 363.
188. See O.C.G.A. § 51-2-4 (2000) ("An employer generally is not responsible for torts
committed by his employee when the employee exercises an independent business and in
it is not subject to the immediate direction and control of the employer.").
189. See id. "An 'independent contractor' is one who, in the pursuit of his own
independent business, undertakes to perform a task for another, while retaining for himself
the right to control the means, method, and manner of its accomplishment." ADAMS, supra
note 154, at 295.
190. 301 Ga. App. 74, 687 S.E.2d 137 (2009).
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tractor J.M.S. Building Maintenance, Inc. (JMS). In Adcox ABM was
hired to perform maintenance and janitorial services for ADT Security's
offices. ABM subcontracted the janitorial services to JMS. Timothy
Adcox, a service manager employed by ADT, alleged that after mopping
the ADT facilities, a JMS employee dumped the used mop water down
the stairs of the service entrance at the back of the facility.' 9' That
night the temperature dropped below freezing, and Adcox slipped and
fell on the ice from the mop water the next morning. 9 2
In determining if the subcontractor was in fact an independent
contractor, the court of appeals used the standard test of "whether the
contract gives, or the employer assumes, the right to control the time,
manner, and method of executing the work as distinguished from the
right merely to require certain definite results in conformity to the
contract."'9 3 Applying this test, the court ruled that a claim of vicarious liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior failed to attach to
ABM. 9 4 ABM did not attempt to direct or control JMS's activities to
the extent necessary to establish a master/servant relationship.'95 The
court held that "[i]nstructions such as giving a deadline for performance
or requiring that work be completed at night or before the open of
business each day do not amount to control over the ... work because
they do not purport to 'control specifically when any particular duties
were to be performed.'""9
VII.

A.

RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

Covenants Not to Compete

1. Overview. Agreements that place general restraints on trade are
void as against public policy.
Generally, courts disfavor noncompete

191. Id. at 75-76, 687 S.E.2d at 138-39.
192. Id. at 74-75, 687 S.E.2d at 138.
193. Id. at 76-77, 687 S.E.2d at 140 (quoting Ross v. Ninety-Two W., Ltd., 201 Ga. App.
887, 891, 412 S.E.2d 876, 881 (1991)).
194. Id. at 78, 687 S.E.2d at 141.
195. Id.; see also O.C.G.A § 51-2-5(5) (2000).
An employer is liable for the negligence of a contractor ... [ilf the employer
retains the right to direct or control the time and manner of executing the work
or interferes and assumes control so as to create the relation of master and
servant or so that an injury results which is traceable to his interference ....
O.C.G.A. § 51-2-5(5).
196. Adcox, 301 Ga. App. at 79, 687 S.E.2d at 141 (quoting Feggans v. Kroger Co., 223
Ga. App. 47, 48, 476 S.E.2d 822, 824 (1996)).
197. O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2(a)(2) (2010).
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agreements in contractual relations because they place restrictions on
trade, thereby reducing competition.'
Pursuant to the 1983 Georgia
Constitution, if a judge finds a restrictive covenant to "defeat[] or
lessen[] competition, or to encourag[el a monopoly," the covenant will be
struck in its entirety." Nonetheless, courts will uphold a noncompete
agreement when the agreement merely places a partial restraint on
trade.'
In general, a noncompete agreement is valid as a partial
restraint on trade when the agreement is specific and is reasonable in
regard to duration, territorial coverage, and the scope of activities
prohibited."1
Whether the terms of a noncompete agreement are reasonable is a
question of law that takes into account "the nature and extent of the
trade or business, the situation of the parties, and all other relevant
circumstances." 2 A questionable restriction, if not void on its face,
may require the introduction of additional facts to determine whether it
However, depending upon the type of contract, courts
is reasonable.'
apply different levels of scrutiny in determining the reasonableness of
the contract. 204 If a noncompete agreement is ancillary to an employment agreement, a stricter standard applies;' if any provision of that
agreement is considered overbroad or unreasonable, the entire agreement becomes invalid.' If the agreement is pursuant to a contract
for the sale of a business, a less stringent standard permits broader
provisions; even if provisions of that agreement are deemed overbroad
or unreasonable, the court may "blue pencil" the agreement, rewriting
or severing the overly broad provisions. 2 0 However, "in restrictive
covenant cases strictly scrutinized as employment contracts, Georgia
does not employ the 'blue pencil' doctrine of severability."m

198. WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 75.
199. GA. CONST. of 1983, art. I, § 6, para. 5(c).
200. WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 75.
201. Id.; see W.R. Grace & Co. v. Mouyal, 262 Ga. 464,465,422 S.E.2d 529,531 (1992).
202. Sysco Food Servs., Inc. v. Chupp, 225 Ga. App. 584, 585, 484 S.E.2d 323, 325
(1997).
203. Koger Props., Inc. v. Adams-Cates Co., 247 Ga. 68,69, 274 S.E.2d 329,331 (1981).
204. See WIMBERLY, supra note 64, at 115.
205. See id. at 75.
206. Drumheller v. Drumheller Bag & Supply, Inc., 204 Ga. App. 623, 626,420 S.E.2d
331, 334 (1992) (quoting Watson v. Waffle House, Inc., 253 Ga. 671, 672, 324 S.E.2d 175,
177 (1985)) (discussing that courts have held covenants not to compete "to be nonseverable
and halve] held that overbreadth of one portion of the covenant so taints the entire
covenant as to make it unenforceable").
207. See supra text accompanying note 6.
208. Advance Tech. Consultants, Inc. v. RoadTrac, LLC, 250 Ga. App. 317, 320, 551
S.E.2d 735, 737 (2001). The court in Advance Technology also stated that "Georgia courts
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Despite a proposed constitutional amendment changing the way courts
approach restrictive covenants ancillary to employment contracts, 209

in H&R Block Eastern Enterprises, Inc. v. Morris,2 10 the Eleventh

Circuit recently reaffirmed the traditional interpretation. In Morris the
Eleventh Circuit, while applying strict scrutiny,"1 ' reversed the district
court and held that the noncompete covenant in the employment
contract in question was enforceable because it appropriately limited the
actions of the former employee without imposing a restriction on
trade.2 12 Morris, a tax professional with H&R Block, started her own
tax service, Dreams Tax Service, Inc., after H&R Block informed her
that she was ineligible for rehire. H&R Block filed suit against Morris
for violating the terms of her employment agreement by soliciting H&R
Block's current and former clients, providing those clients with taxpreparation services, and soliciting former employees of H&R Block. The
district court judge ruled that the noncompetition covenant of the
employment contract was unenforceable, rendering all other covenants
unenforceable as well.213 The Eleventh Circuit reversed.2 14
The Eleventh Circuit did not hold any of the covenants in the
employment contract to be unenforceable. 21 6 The Eleventh Circuit
determined the covenant was reasonable in all respects, writing, "The
non-competition covenant is limited to a specific geographic area, the
types of activities performed by Morris at Block, the customers serviced
by Morris at Block, and a two-year duration.... [Alfter applying the
three-element analysis, we conclude this non-competition covenant is
reasonable under Georgia law."216
2. Franchise Agreements. At the beginning of this year's survey
period, the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed the Georgia Court of

have traditionally divided restrictive covenants into two categories: 'covenants ancillary to
an employment contract, which receive strict scrutiny and are not blue-penciled, and
covenants ancillary to a sale of [a] business, which receive much less scrutiny and may be
blue-penciled.'" Id. at 319, 551 S.E.2d at 736 (quoting Habif, Arogeti & Wynne, P.C. v.
Baggett, 231 Ga. App. 289, 289-90, 498 S.E.2d 346, 349 (1998)). However, an amendment
to the Georgia Constitution would permit courts to "blue pencil" restrictive covenants
ancillary to employment contracts. See supra Part I.L; see also suprm text accompanying
note 6.
209. See supra Part IIA.
210. 606 F.3d 1285 (2010).
211. Id. at 1290.
212. See id. at 1292-93.
213. Id. at 1287-88.
214. Id. at 1296.
215. See id. at 1294.
216. Id. at 1292-93.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

206

[Vol. 62

Appeals decision in Atlanta Bread Co. International v. LuptonSmith. 7 The supreme court held that to enforce a covenant not to
compete in a franchise agreement, the covenant must contain definite
territorial limitations and specify the restricted activities with sufficient
particularity.2 1 In Atlanta Bread, the plaintiff owned several franchises of the Atlanta Bread Company, and his franchise agreement
contained restrictive covenants. The covenant restricted the franchisee
or principal shareholder from directly or indirectly engaging in, or
acquiring financial interest in, any bakery or deli business whose
method of operation resembled that of the Atlanta Bread Company.
While the plaintiff owned these franchises, Atlanta Bread learned that
the plaintiff entered into a franchise agreement with PJ's Coffee, a
competing business. Consequently, Atlanta Bread terminated the
plaintiff's franchise agreement on the ground that his new PJ's Coffee
franchise constituted a material breach of the restrictive covenant.2 19
The supreme court held that the restrictive covenant was unenforceThe supreme court
able because it lacked a territorial limitation.
covenant
of
a
restrictive
if
any
part
agreement,
noted that in a franchise
Although
is unreasonable, the entire agreement is unenforceable."
Atlanta Bread contended that the usual rules regarding restrictive
covenants in the employment context should not apply to franchise
agreements, the supreme court held that a covenant not to compete in
a franchise agreement "receive[s] the same treatment as noncompetition
covenants found in employment contracts."222 The same measure of
reasonableness applies to both contracts. 223 However, although such
was not the case in Atlanta Bread, had the franchise agreement
specifically provided for the severability and survivability of restrictive
covenants apart from the enforceability of the underlying agreement,
"'the covenants in the contract [would be] independent,' so that they
[would have been] enforced despite the possible breach of the underlying
agreement."a

217.
218.
219.
220.

285 Ga. 587, 679 S.E.2d 722 (2009).
See id. at 590-91, 679 S.E.2d at 725.
Id. at 588, 679 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 591, 679 S.E.2d at 725.

221. Id.

222. Id. at 589, 679 S.E.2d at 724; see also supra Part VIIA.1.
223. See Atlanta Bread, 285 Ga. at 589, 679 S.E.2d at 724.
224. Zampatti v. Tradebank Intl Franchising Corp., 235 Ga. App. 333,339, 508 S.E.2d
750, 756 (1998) (quoting Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Harris, 224 Ga. 759, 761, 164 S.E.2d
727, 729 (1968)).
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3. Scope of Prohibited Activities. During the survey period, the
supreme court held in Coleman v. Retina Consultants, PC.M that
restrictive covenants in an employment contract that contain neither
geographical nor temporal limitations constitute an unlawful restraint
on trade."' In Coleman Retina Consultants (d/b/a The Retina Eye
Center (TREC)) employed Coleman, a software engineer, to further
develop a medical billing program previously created by Coleman. With
the assistance of TREC personnel and doctors, Coleman developed his
initial product into a more comprehensive program allowing for the
integration of the storage of medical records with billing. Coleman and
TREC entered into a Software Agreement that divided the rights to the
new program between the parties.'
The agreement read in relevant
part that Coleman would "not distribute, vend or license to any
ophthalmologist or optometrist the ... software or any computer
application competitive with the ... software without the written

consent of TREC."a After his resignation, Coleman
attempted to distribute, vend, or license ... the ... software; failed

and refused to disclose to TREC the passwords required to read and
revise copies of the . .. software; refused to provide copies to TREC of
all documentation ... relating to the programming and use of the

software; [and] attempted to use TREC's proprietary information and
trade secrets to compete with [TREC.m
The supreme court held the employment contract's covenants unenforceable: "[Tihe noncompete clause at issue in this appeal is unenforceable
as a matter of law .... [The agreement contains no time limitation, as
the contract purports to limit Coleman's actions in perpetuity. 23 0
Furthermore, the supreme court held that the restrictive covenants were
unenforceable as applied to Coleman's use of the software absent
applications and information that constitute trade secrets derived
directly from TREC.231

The court of appeals held in Pittman v. Coosa Medical Group, P.C.232
that minor deviations in the restricted activities under a covenant not
to compete that are of the same general type fall within the scope of

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

286 Ga. 317, 687 S.E.2d 457 (2009).
See id. at 320, 687 S.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 317-18, 687 S.E.2d at 459.
Id. at 318, 687 S.E.2d at 459-60.
Id. at 318, 687 S.E.2d at 460.
Id. at 320, 687 S.E.2d at 461.
Id. at 321, 687 S.E.2d at 461-62.
300 Ga. App. 529, 685 S.E.2d 753 (2009).

208

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

prohibited activities covered by the covenant.
In Pittman a group
of physicians, including Dr. Pittman, left another practice to form Coosa
Medical Group (CMG). Six years after starting the practice, CMG began
requiring its physicians to sign and enter into employment contracts
The covenant prohibited the
containing restrictive covenants.'
physician "for a period of one (1) year from .. . engag[ing] in the practice
of medicine in [the professional medical specialty of neurosurgery] within
Dr. Pittman
a thirty (30) mile radius of [CMG's] principal office."'
informed CMG of his intent to leave CMG and join a competing
neurosurgery practice. Dr. Pittman argued he was permitted to do so
because CMG practices neurology, and he practices neurosurgery, and
the two fields are complementary and not competitive.' The court of
appeals disagreed with Dr. Pittman's contention "that CMG had no
legitimate business interest in enforcing the covenant.""
The court of appeals reasoned that because CMG built its business
model around "an integration of the two specialties," a legitimate
First, because
business interest existed in enforcing the covenant.'
of the relatively small community of doctors that practice neurological
medicine, when a neurosurgeon leaves one practice to practice across
town with another office, many questions are raised within the small
neurological medicine community about the competency of the practice
Second, the presence of competing
that the doctor abandoned.'
physicians in the neurological field caused significant problems in
recruiting a replacement for Dr. Pittman.o The court of appeals held
that these factors were a significant enough reason to enforce the
noncompete agreement between CMG and Dr. Pittman.2"
Another issue addressed in Pittman was whether enforcement of the
covenant not to compete had been waived.2 '2 CMG referred twelve
patients to Dr. Pittman and the practice that he joined. Pittman argued
that these referrals constituted a waiver."a CMG's representative said
that a "'patient's care supersedes ... this [contractual dispute],' and Dr.
Pittman was 'going to render the best medical decision' available in the

233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

See id. at 530-31, 685 S.E.2d at 755-56.
Id. at 530, 685 S.E.2d at 755.
Id. (second and third alterations in original).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 531-32, 685 S.E.2d at 756.
See id.
Id. at 532, 685 S.E.2d at 756.
Id.
See id. at 534, 685 S.E.2d at 757.
Id. at 534, 685 S.E.2d at 757-58.
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community."2 " The court of appeals stated, "CMG made it clear to Dr.
Pittman that it did not consent to Dr. Pittman's violation of the terms
of the restrictive covenants. Dr. Pittman nevertheless made a choice to
continue practicing neurosurgery within the restricted area even if this
breached his contractual obligations to CMG."2' 5 The choice Dr.
Pittman made to breach the covenant not to compete was his alone to
make and was in the best interests of the patients; the actions that CMG
took in the wake of Dr. Pittman's decision lacked any bearing on Dr.
Pittman's violation of the restrictive covenants. "
4. Specification with Particularity. During the survey period,
the court of appeals held in Wachovia Insurance Services, Inc. v.
Fallon... that a restrictive covenant prohibiting post-employment
contact with customers was overly broad because it defined a customer
as "any individual or entity that has purchased an insurance contract
through [Wachovia Insurance Services]." " Fallon was a partial owner
of an insurance group that Wachovia Insurance Services (Wachovia)
bought out. After the buy out, Wachovia employed Fallon as a senior
vice president and gave him stock and cash as part of the sale. Three
years after the buy out, Wachovia requested that Fallon sign a
confidentiality and nonsolicitation agreement that essentially made
Fallon an at-will employee. Two years later, Wachovia reduced Fallon's
bonus and commission structure, which induced Fallon to resign and
form his own company, Fallon Benefits Group, Inc.'
The court considered whether the restrictive covenant in the nonsolicitation agreement constituted "an unreasonable restraint on trade" by
adopting the pervasive definition of customer that Wachovia uses.250
By defining a customer as any person who has, at any time in the past,
purchased an insurance contract through Wachovia, the covenant was
held to be an unlawful restriction of trade.251 The "employer ha[s] no
legitimate business interest in preventing solicitation of clients who may
have [previously] severed [their] relationship with [the] employer."252

244. Id. at 534, 685 S.E.2d at 758 (alteration in original).
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. 299 Ga. App. 440, 682 S.E.2d 657 (2009).
248. Id. at 443, 682 S.E.2d at 661 (internal quotation marks omitted).
249. Id. at 44041, 682 S.E.2d at 660.
250. Id. at 44243, 682 S.E.2d at 661 (quoting Trujillo v. Great S. Equip. Sales, LLC,
289 Ga. App. 474, 476, 657 S.E.2d 581, 583 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
251. See id. at 443, 682 S.E.2d at 661; see also O.C.G.A. § 13-8-2.1(gxl) (Supp. 2009).
252. Falon, 299 Ga. App. at 444, 682 S.E.2d at 661 (citing Gill v. Poe & Brown, Inc.,
241 Ga. App. 580, 583, 524 S.E.2d 328, 331 (1999)).
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In Paramount Tax & Accounting, LLC v. H&R Block Eastern
Enterprises, Inc.,"* the court of appeals ruled that an employment
contract that failed to specify a geographic limitation in a restrictive
In most circumstances, if a noncompete
covenant was invalid.'
agreement lacks a geographic limitation, Georgia courts will not enforce
because such covenants are per se unreasonable under the
it'
Georgia Constitution.2 6 The covenant prohibited Mary Squire, the
employee at issue, from working for any employer providing tax services
"if that employer is located, conducts business, or solicits business in
Block's Gainesville [Georgia] District or within ten miles of the
district's borders."m The court reasoned that the "language prevents
Squire from accepting employment anywhere in the United States, if her
prospective employer engages in the preparation and electronic filing of
tax returns and also either has an office or advertises in, or within ten
The court ruled that such a
miles of, Block's Gainesville District."
geographic limitation was unreasonable and rendered the entire
employment contract unenforceable as a matter of law.259

B. NondisclosureAgreements
Another issue at bar in Fallon was whether a former employee
violated the Georgia Trade Secrets Act" when the employee personally collected client information from a previous employer while employed
by a subsequent employer and did not obtain the information through
an employer-generated client list.26 Wachovia accused the defendants
of misappropriating trade secrets by failing to delete customer information they had compiled on their personal BlackBerries during their
employment with Wachovia.262 The Georgia Trade Secrets Act generally defines "[tirade secret [as] information . .. which is not commonly
known by or available to the public and which information: (A) [dierives
economic value .. . from not being generally known to ... other persons
who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (B) [ils the
subject of efforts ... to maintain its secrecy."' Fallon and the other

253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.
263.

299 Ga. App. 596, 683 S.E.2d 141 (2009).
Id. at 601, 683 S.E.2d at 146.
See, e.g., Lane Co. v. Taylor, 174 Ga. App. 356, 358, 330 S.E.2d 112, 116 (1985).
See Barnes Group, Inc. v. Harper, 653 F.2d 175 (1981).
Paramount,299 Ga. App. at 601, 683 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 602, 683 S.E.2d at 146.
Id. at 602, 683 S.E.2d at 147.
O.C.G.A. §§ 10-1-760 to -767 (2009).
Fallon, 299 Ga. App. at 444-45, 682 S.E.2d at 662.
Id. at 444, 682 S.E.2d at 662-63.
O.C.G.A. § 10-1-761(4).
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former Wachovia employees that he subsequently employed used client
lists that they compiled while at Wachovia, but the court of appeals held
that this information did not constitute a trade secret.m The information that Wachovia claimed constituted protected information was
obtainable from a free, public website where Wachovia reported its
Thus, Wachovia's claim failed because of the
customer information.'
public nature of the information on the client lists and Wachovia's
failure to deliver proof that its information was intentionally misappropriated.26
Wachovia also claimed the use of this information stored on BlackBerries by Fallon and his employees constituted "computer theft."
Under Georgia law, computer theft occurs when "[alny person ... uses
a computer .. . with knowledge that such use is without authority and
with the intention of: (1) [tlaking or appropriating any property of
another . . ; (2) [olbtaining property by any deceitful means . . ; or (3)

[c]onverting property to such person's use in violation of an agreement
or other known legal obligation.'m The court held this claim to be
meritless because there was no evidence that a computer was used with
The court held
"knowledge that such use [was] without authority."
that the requisite mental state did not exist because Fallon and his
employees did not understand that they did not have the authority to
access the information on their personal BlackBerries.27 0
In FallonWachovia also claimed that Fallon Benefits's employee Julie
Mitzel (also a former Wachovia employee) misappropriated trade secrets
when she kept examples of her work with Wachovia after she left
Mitzel worked as a creative
Wachovia and joined Fallon Benefits.
services manager with Wachovia before accepting employment with
Fallon Benefits. As an artist, Mitzel took with her (after she terminated
her employment with Wachovia) brochures that she designed for her
personal professional portfolio while working at Wachovia."' These
brochures failed to qualify as a trade secret because they were not

264. Fallon,299 Ga. App. at 446, 682 S.E.2d at 663.
265. Id. (showing that the information acquired could be found at the website
www.freeERISA.com).
266.

Id.

267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id at 449-50, 682 S.E.2d at 665 (internal quotation marks omitted).
O.C.GA. § 16-9-93(a) (2007).
Fallon, 299 Ga. App. at 450, 682 S.E.2d at 665; see also O.C.G.A. § 16-9-93(a).
Fallon, 299 Ga. App. at 450, 682 S.E.2d at 665.
Id. at 447, 682 S.E.2d at 663-64.
Id.
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misappropriated; rather, they remained in storage at Mitzel's home and
were not used to design competing literature.
In Paramount,however, the court of appeals did hold that a violation
of a nondisclosure agreement occurrred when a former employee
misappropriated privileged information."' Although the court held the
covenant not to compete to be unenforceable because its geographic scope
was overly broad,"' the court ruled that Paramount, through H&R
Block's former employee Mary Squire, misappropriated trade secrets of
H&R Block."' After Squire terminated her employment with Block
and started working for Paramount, Paramount sent out over 5000
solicitations, which included a coupon for Paramount's services."'
H&R Block proved that Squire used her managerial access to obtain
privileged client information because at least some of the addresses were
taken directly from an H&R Block database."' Because Squire had
misappropriated trade secrets from H&R Block, the trial court issued an
injunction that restricted Paramount from performing any work for any
The court struck the
clients found in the H&R Block database."
injunction as an abuse of the trial court's discretion because the
"injunction afforded Block far broader relief than it was entitled to."'
The court ruled that a more equitable injunction would have restricted
Paramount from performing services for any client who tried to use the
coupon that Paramount included in its unscrupulous solicitation. 2

C. NonsolicitationAgreements
The court of appeals held in Fallon that hiring employees from a
former employer does not violate a nonsolicitation agreement if the
employees contact the new employer and begin working for that

273. See id. at 447, 682 S.E.2d at 664.
274. Paramount,299 Ga. App. at 603-04, 683 S.E.2d at 148.
275. Id. at 601, 683 S.E.2d at 146.
276. Id. at 603-04, 683 S.E.2d at 148.
277. Id. at 598-99, 683 S.E.2d at 144-45.
278. Id. at 599-600, 683 S.E.2d at 145.
Block introduced evidence supporting the conclusion that at least some of the
addreses . . . were taken directly from the Block client database .... One such
[solicitation] was received by a couple living in Kansas, whose tax return was filed
out of a Gainesville District office. . . .
[Another] Block employee . .. had filed a tax return for her then 94-year-old
great aunt .... The employee .. . gave her own parents' address as that of the
aunt, (and] .. . Paramount sent the great aunt a solicitation at that address.
Id.
279. Id. at 604-05, 683 S.E.2d at 148.
280. Id. at 605, 683 S.E.2d at 148.
281. Id. at 605-06, 683 S.E.2d at 149.
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employer through their own volition.282 While still employed at
Wachovia, Fallon signed a nonsolicitation agreement that stated he
would not "directly or indirectly ... solicit or induce ... any person
employed by [Wachovia] . . . or ... enter into an employment or agency

relationship with the Employee" for a period of two years after termination of employment.'
Despite this agreement, Fallon Benefits
employed two former Wachovia employees; however, the court held that
because these employees approached Fallon for employment, Fallon's
lack of solicitation or inducement barred any claim for breach of the
nonsolicitation agreement.m
Additionally, Wachovia attempted to establish that Fallon breached
his fiduciary duties and duty of loyalty when he breached the nonsolicitation agreement. Wachovia accused Fallon of making an appointment
with another Wachovia employee whom he later hired, scheduling
business appointments with clients that Fallon kept after leaving
Wachovia, and discussing his plans to go into business for himself with
a golfing partner-all while still employed by Wachovia Insurance.'
In his role as senior vice president of employee benefits, Fallon
"occup[ied] a fiduciary relationship to the corporation and its shareholders, and [should be] held to the standard of utmost good faith and
loyalty."
However, the court held the claims of soliciting employees
and clients to be without merit because neither Fallon nor his company
directly engaged in competition with Wachovia regarding those
clients.27
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Although labor and employment issues in Georgia law often are not as
complex as their federal counterparts, the issues arising under state law
are becoming more challenging with each passing year. Adding to this
challenge is the growing overlap between state and federal issues.
Regardless of whether a practitioner professes to specialize in state,
federal, administrative, or trial law, it is important to recognize that any
one law or legal proceeding can and does impact other relations between
employer and employee.

282. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. at 444, 682 S.E.2d at 662; see also supra Part VILA.4.
283. Fallon, 299 Ga. App. at 444, 682 S.E.2d at 661-62.
284. Id. at 444, 682 S.E.2d at 662.
285. Id. at 447-48, 682 S.E.2d at 664.
286. Id. at 448, 682 S.E.2d at 664 (quoting Hilb, Rogal & Hamilton Co. v. Holley, 295
Ga. App. 54, 57-58, 670 S.E.2d 874, 877 (2008)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
287. Id.

